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Defining Civil RICO’S 'Injury to Business or Property' Requirement – Part 1

By Randy D. Gordon
March 9, 2026
Texas Lawyer

Defining Civil RICO’S 'Injury to Business or Property' Requirement – Part 1

By Randy D. Gordon
March 9, 2026
Texas Lawyer

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The problem springs from the statute’s complicated structure and language, the latter of which is by turns ambiguous or vague. The statute’s purpose is also uncertain, creating a state of affairs that leads to disparate conclusions regarding its applicability depending on whether a particular case is criminal or civil.


More than 50 years after its statutory birth, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) continues to present interpretation and application challenges. The problem springs from the statute’s complicated structure and language, the latter of which is by turns ambiguous or vague. The statute’s purpose is also uncertain, creating a state of affairs that leads to disparate conclusions regarding its applicability depending on whether a particular case is criminal or civil. It’s not surprising, then, that the United States Supreme Court must step in every few years to resolve a fresh circuit split. The 2024 term was no exception: there, the Supreme Court ventured into an open question in Medical Marijuana v. Horn (Medical Marijuana)—namely, what it means for a civil RICO plaintiff to be “injured in his business or property.” To that question we’ll turn in due course—but first a quick tour of RICO’s interpretive landscape.

Divining a legislature’s intent is a fraught exercise, and sifting through legislative history often provides ammunition for competing interpretive arguments. RICO’s legislative history is no exception. There are, nonetheless, intentional assumptions that aren’t subject to reasonable dispute. In fact, Congress declared that it passed the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970—of which RICO is one part—“to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.” But of course, RICO reaches far beyond “organized crime” in the mafia sense, and by including a civil-standing provision, that reach was extended even further.

Debates over the scope of RICO began in earnest in the 1980s and have not abated since. And despite well-documented hostility to civil RICO, courts have long conceded that RICO has evolved “into something quite different from the original conception of its enactors,” who hoped to “supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime.” This evolution in scope is a function of the statute itself, which—depending on one’s point of view—is (1) written with “self-consciously expansive language” that is to be given a liberal construction, or (2) poorly drafted and void for vagueness. As a consequence, lower courts have been left in a precedential lurch and therefore have, generally speaking, oscillated between constructions that facilitate criminal RICO prosecutions and tamp down civil RICO litigation.

High in importance among the civil dampers placed on RICO’s civil-standing provision, Section 1964(c), is the recognition “that Congress modeled Section 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws … Courts have therefore looked to Section 4 of the Clayton Act; its predecessor, Section 7 of the Sherman Act; and cases construing these statutes in order to identify limits to the civil remedy afforded by Section 1964(c).” As a clear example of this phenomenon, the Court long ago reviewed Section 4 and Section 7 antitrust jurisprudence to conclude that Section 1964(c)’s “by reason of” proviso mandated more than “but-for” cause: proximate cause. This reasoning required no linguistic contortions: Congress “used the same words” to establish a private right of action in both domains, so “we can only assume [Congress] intended them to have the same meaning that courts had already given them.” In a later installment in this series, we’ll see how that argument fared within the context of Medical Marijuana.

Despite the nearly identical language forming the basis of Section 1964(c) and Clayton Act Section 4, courts do not always interpret and apply them in pari materia. In fact, the Supreme Court has noted, “[a]lthough we have often looked to the Clayton Act for guidance in construing Section 1964(c), we have not treated the two statutes as interchangeable. We have declined to transplant features of the Clayton Act’s cause of action into the RICO context where doing so would be inappropriate.” For over five decades, one unsolved interpretive puzzle has been the meaning of RICO’s “business or property” proviso, injury to which must be shown to establish RICO standing. So what is injury to business or property? As with many questions that RICO poses, there are no clear answers at the margins, a situation compounded by a lack of much guidance in the text of the statute itself. What ensues, therefore, is the application of various techniques designed to harmonize with legislative intent, including reviews of Clayton Act jurisprudence as well as other sources of law (e.g., state-law definitions of “property”).

There exists something close to a consensus that state-law definitions of “property” should be engrafted onto Section 1964(c). And courts also look to state law, at least in part, to discern the meaning of “business.” In one pre-Medical Marijuana view (e.g., that of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits), “business” generally means that RICO does not encompass claims that arise from personal injuries. In another view (e.g., that of the Second and Eleventh Circuits), the issue is not so clear-cut, especially in a case where there are both personal and business/property injuries.

More of moment in our present context is that a civil RICO or antitrust plaintiff must be “injured in his business or property” to establish standing. Even though the phrase eludes definitive interpretation even after Medical Marijuana, the Supreme Court has previously construed this injury requirement in the context of the antitrust laws. In Reiter v. Sonotone, the court held that “business or property” means more than “business activity or property,” but the phrase is not unconstrained: personal injuries are excluded. In any event, these efforts to identify what “business or property” includes need not further detain us, for our primary object of study is what “business or property” excludes: personal injuries.

At a surface level, this inquiry is easily resolvable: personal injuries are not injuries to business or property. But as courts and commentators have noted, many tort claims involve both personal injuries (“I was hit by a bus and broke my leg”) and proprietary harm (“I lost my job as a dancer because my leg was broken”). And civil RICO is, after all, a statutory tort, so it’s not as if there’s an agreed-upon way to always carve personal and property/business injuries at the joint. Now, this is not to say that purely physical personal injuries can form the basis of a cognizable civil RICO claim. But an injury analysis under Section 1964(c), where many predicate acts—like murder or felony assault—essentially presume the presence of personal injuries, can be much more complicated than one under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, where it’s unlikely that someone can be physically injured by monopolization or price fixing. It is that complication that the Supreme Court set out to explore in Medical Marijuana, and that we’ll take up next time.


Randy D. Gordon is the founding partner of the Dallas and Fort Worth offices of Duane Morris. He is executive professor of law, history, and performance, visualization & fine arts at Texas A&M University. This series is excerpted from a forthcoming article, “Defining Civil RICO’s ‘Injury to Business or Property’ Requirement: The Supreme Court Takes a Few Steps, Says It Punts, but Actually Fumbles,” in the Penn State Law Review.

Reprinted with permission from ALM Media Properties LLC. All rights reserved.