This article explains that only “aggrieved” parties—those harmed or denied relief—can appeal court decisions under CPLR 5511. Courts can assess aggrievement on their own, and simply disagreeing with a ruling isn’t enough. There are exceptions, like non-parties with affected interests or appeals on alternative grounds. Understanding these rules is crucial for proper appellate standing.
This month, we examine the jurisdictional requirement of “aggrievement” (CPLR 5511). “Aggrievement is an appellate concept which is designed to screen out appeals taken by those who have only a mere academic interest, or no interest at all, in the outcome.” Newton v. McFarlane, 174 A.D.3d 67 (2d Dept., 2019) (citation omitted). The volume of recent cases addressing this threshold requirement suggests that would-be appellants often overlook it, resulting in dismissal of their appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
The general rule is that only parties—and only “aggrieved” parties—may appeal. CPLR 5511 (“Permissible appellant and respondent”) provides that “[a]n aggrieved party or a person substituted for him may appeal from any appealable judgment or order except one entered upon the default of the aggrieved party.”
The requirement that an appellant be an aggrieved party is jurisdictional and is subject to inquiry by an appellate court on its own motion. “It is appropriate for an appellate court to inquire into the appealability of the order under review, even where the respondent on the appeal has not specifically requested that the appeal be dismissed.” Wohl v. Wohl, 26 A.D.3d 326 (2d Dept., 2006) (citations omitted).
In Byrnes v. Senate of State of New York, 41 N.Y.3d 1022 (2024), example, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal “sua sponte, upon the ground that [appellants] are not parties aggrieved.” While it is usually readily apparent whether a party wishing to appeal is aggrieved by a judgment or order, this is not always the case and can be a source of difficulty.
The Meaning of “Aggrievement”
The drafters of the CPLR declined to provide a statutory definition of “aggrievement,” leaving its resolution to case law. The leading case of Parochial Bus Systems, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 539, 544-45 (1983) (citations omitted), provides a useful starting point for determining whether a party is aggrieved by a judgment or order for purposes of appellate standing:
Generally, the party who has successfully obtained a judgment or order in his favor is not aggrieved by it, and, consequently, has no need and, in fact, no right to appeal. The major exception to this general rule, however, is that the successful party may appeal or cross-appeal from a judgment or order in his favor if he is nevertheless prejudiced because it does not grant him complete relief.
This exception would include those situations in which the successful party received an award less favorable than he sought or a judgment which denied him some affirmative claim or substantial right. But where the successful party has obtained the full relief sought, he has no grounds for appeal or cross appeal.
Courts have construed Parochial Bus to mean that “the concept of aggrievement is about whether relief was granted or withheld, and not about the reasons therefor.” See Mixon v. TBV, Inc., 76 A.D.3d 144, 149 (2d Dept., 2010). Thus, “[a] person is aggrieved within the meaning of CPLR 5511 when he or she asks for relief but that relief is denied in whole or in part, or when someone asks for relief against him or her, which the person opposes, and the relief is granted in whole or in part.” Sharma v. Mullins, 245 A.D.3d 857, 857 (2d Dept., Jan. 21, 2026) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
Since aggrievement depends on whether relief was granted or withheld, and not the reasons therefor, “[a] party is not aggrieved merely because it disagrees with the particular findings, rationale or the opinion supporting a judgment or order. That an order may contain language or reasoning which * * * parties deem adverse to their interests does not furnish them with a basis for standing to take an appeal.” Avigdor v. Avigdor, ___ A.D.3d ___, 2026 WL 452257, at *2 (2d Dept., Feb. 18, 2026) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Austin Powder Co., 68 N.Y.2d 465, 472-73 (1986); Parochial Bus, supra, 60 N.Y.2d at 544-45.
As expressly stated in CPLR 5511, a party may not appeal from a judgment or order “entered upon the default of [that] party.” Instead, the proper procedure is for the defaulting party to move to vacate the default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) (“Relief from judgment or order”), and in the event of the denial of that motion, to appeal from the resultant order. See Rojas v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., ___ A.D.3d ___, 2026 WL 758968, at *1 (2d Dept., Mar. 18, 2026).
An exception to this rule has been recognized where a party appears and contests a motion for leave to enter a default judgment. In such circumstances, the default judgment is directly appealable. See, e.g., Levine v. Singal, 172 A.D.3d 402, 403 (1st Dept., 2019).
Alternatively, where a contested default is followed by an inquest on damages in which the defaulting party participates and raises various issues, an appeal from the ensuing judgment entered after the inquest brings up for review the default order as well as issues relating to the inquest that was contested, including the determination of damages. See James v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 256 n.3 (1967) (“The provision of CPLR 5511 that an aggrieved party may appeal from an appealable judgment or order ‘except one entered upon the default of [such] aggrieved party’ does not bar the [appellants] in this case since they ask us to review only matters which were the subject of contest below”).
No appeal lies from an order or judgment entered upon the consent of the appealing party. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jackson, 240 A.D.3d 548, 549 (2d Dept., 2025). Thus, a party who stipulates to downward or upward modification of a damage award in lieu of a new trial—the remittitur and additur procedures—is not aggrieved by that modification and may not appeal from it. See Dudley v. Perkins, 235 N.Y. 448, 457 (1923).
However, if the adverse party appeals from the judgment on unrelated issues, CPLR 5501(a)(5) confers jurisdiction on the Appellate Division to review the appropriateness of the remittitur or additur and, if appropriate, to reinstate part or all of the original damage award.
By the same token, a defendant who stipulates to an additur may seek appellate review of other unrelated issues in the case such as liability issues. See Adams v. Genie Industries, Inc., 14 N.Y.3d 353, 541 (2010). For example, despite having stipulated to the additur, the appellant in Adams still had standing to argue that “it has no liability to plaintiff at all—that the case should never have been submitted to the jury—or, in the alternative, that it is entitled to a new liability trial.”
As a general rule, where multiple parties are involved, a party is not aggrieved by a disposition made of the rights or liabilities as between other parties and lacks standing to appeal from that disposition. Thus, “a defendant is not aggrieved by the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint against a codefendant, but, rather, only by the dismissal of that defendant’s cross claim or third-party claim against a codefendant.” Mixon, supra, 76 A.D.3d at 152; see also Lopez v. Ridgewood Bushwick Homesteading Assistance Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., ___ A.D.3d ___, 249 N.Y.S.3d 234, 236 (2d Dept., Feb. 25, 2026) (defendant not aggrieved by dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint against a codefendant); Guzman v. Howe, ___ A.D.3d ___, 2026 WL 516613 (2d Dept., Feb. 25, 2026) (defendants aggrieved by portion of judgment that dismissed their cross-claims against a codefendant; plaintiff not aggrieved by portion dismissal of cross-claims).
Alternative Ground for Affirmance
Where a case has been decided in a party’s favor on one of several possible grounds, the prevailing party is not aggrieved even though the court rejected another ground. But this does not mean that a prevailing party is left without any remedy in the event of an appeal by the losing party. Rather, CPLR 5501(a)(1) permits the non-aggrieved prevailing party to raise an alternative ground for affirmance of the judgment or order in response to the losing party’s appeal.
CPLR 5501(a)(1) provides that “[a]n appeal from a final judgment brings up for review * * * any non-final judgment or order which necessarily affects the final judgment, including any which was adverse to the respondent on appeal from the final judgment and which, if reversed, would entitle the respondent to prevail in whole or in part on that appeal.” “Hence, the successful party, who is not aggrieved by the judgment or order appealed from and who, therefore, has no right to bring an appeal, is entitled to raise an error made below, for review by the appellate court, as long as that error has been properly preserved and would, if corrected, support a judgment in his favor.” Parochial Bus, supra, 60 N.Y.2d at 545-46.
Suppose, for example, a plaintiff in a personal injury action asserts separate causes of action for common law negligence and Labor Law violations. At trial, the jury returns a verdict for the plaintiff on the negligence claim but finds for the defendant on the Labor Law claim, resulting in dismissal of that claim. The defendant then appeals from the ensuing judgment entered in the plaintiff’s favor on the negligence verdict.
The plaintiff is not aggrieved by, and therefore cannot cross-appeal from, the judgment even though it dismissed the Labor Law claim. However, in addition to opposing the defendant’s appeal with respect to the negligence claim, section 5501(a)(1) entitles the plaintiff—the respondent on the appeal—to have the appellate court review the dismissal of the Labor Law claim.
Thus, even if the court were to rule in the defendant’s favor on the negligence claim (resulting in its dismissal on appeal), it may still rule in the plaintiff’s favor on the Labor Law claim (resulting in its reinstatement on appeal), as an alternative ground for affirmance of the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Aggrieved Non-Parties
Despite the language in CPLR 5511 that only an “aggrieved party” may appeal, there are exceptions where a non-party may appeal from a judgment or order that directly affects his or her interest. In Newton, supra, for example, the attorney for a non-party child had standing to pursue an appeal on behalf of the child from an order determining the custody of the child. See 174 A.D.3d at 74. Similarly, a non-party who unsuccessfully moves to intervene is entitled to appeal from the denial of intervention. See, e.g., LNV Corp. v. King, 244 A.D.3d 829 (2d Dept., 2025).
An attorney for a party may appeal where the attorney has been sanctioned (Miller v. Falco, 170 A.D.3d 707 [2d Dept., 2019]) or disqualified (Brandice M.C. v. Wilder, 221 A.D.3d 1532 (4th Dept., 2023). Conversely, a party lacks standing to appeal from an order sanctioning his or her attorney (Madigan v. Berkeley Cap. LLC, 39 N.Y.3d 927 [2022]), and a defendant lacks standing to appeal from an order granting the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the attorneys for a co-defendant. See, e.g., Sharma, supra, 245 A.D.3d at 857.
The lesson that emerges is that, in all but the most obvious instances of “aggrievement,” it is advisable to consult with the case law interpreting these terms to confirm that this threshold jurisdictional requirement has been satisfied.
Reprinted with permission from New York Law Journal, © ALM Media Properties LLC. All rights reserved.
